Vir eruditionis minime vulgaris
Happy 2024
De Promisiis (= Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis II, 11) marks the beginning of Grotius's treatment of contractual obligations and, more significantly, the rights arising ex pactione. Commentators have recently observed (for example - Astorri and Decock) how Grotius's analysis largely followed the Neoscholastic analysis of Lessius and De Soto.
What I find interesting, however, is Grotius's decision to begin his own analysis with a humanist - François Connan, whom he describes as a "vulgar man of minimal learning." 
Grotius was probably thinking of this passage:
which referenced both Aristotle and Ulpian:
Connan, thus, serves as an inspiration for Grotius's controversial view that it is entirely within one's right to give up that very right - and it needn't be done so by way of a contractual transaction involving exchange consideration.
Why target Connan first? Why the urgency?
Connan (1508-1551) had apparently already acquired a controversial reputation among academic lawyers specializing on the law of contracts. He is perhaps most famous for his "synallagmatic theory of contract" (which I have summarized briefly here). All genuine contracts must be, at some level, bilateral in exchange of obligations. A "synallagma" (a quid-pro-quo exchange of some kind) must take place between parties. Connan's approach eliminates unilateral contracts (like a stipulatio), while including certain categories of pacts and promises. It represents a fundamental shift from classical law which only recognized certain specific contractual forms (like Emptio-Venditio, Societas, Mandatum, etc.) to a general theory of contract based on synallagma.
Grotius summarizes Connan's basic position at the opening:
Grotius was probably thinking of this passage:
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| D.50.16.19 |
It seems his worry, in Connan's approach, is that the synallagmatic requirement can be too demanding and sometimes invalidate contractual engagements that are desirable to the parties involved. It also cheapens the value of promises and, in general, of voluntary acts. So, if you want to make a promise without requiring anything in return of the promisee, it would be recognized as obligatory - at least for Grotius.
Grotius's opening critical comments on Connan are revealing because they show what is to become a central theme in his discussion of promises and contracts: The freedom of will. One need not enter into a synallagmatic engagement in order to alienate and deliver one's property to another, or to alienate and transfer one's right to another. One is free to do so of their own right.
Connan, thus, serves as an inspiration for Grotius's controversial view that it is entirely within one's right to give up that very right - and it needn't be done so by way of a contractual transaction involving exchange consideration.
There's more interesting stuff on Connan which I'll touch upon next.
