More on sociability: Pufendorf

In the previous post, I touched on the interpretive problems associated with 'natural sociability' and 'natural law' in Grotius.  Somehow, the substance of natural law is connected to the axiomatic 'natural sociability' of humans.  And, while I'm not particularly committed to any particular theory that tries to link the two, my current working theory is that Grotius was trying to articulate a kind of moral anthropology, on the working assumption of the sociable, other-regarding qualities of humans.  What emerges is a kind of early evolutionary theory of social norms:  These are the rules of social interaction and cooperation (cp. good-faith, gratitude, etc) that all humans should try to follow if we are to continue enjoying the benefits that follow from social life.  

This is what I think Grotius means when he says natural law is reason, an expression of means-ends rationality.  If our shared goal is to continue enjoying the benefits of social life, it is rational that we observe those norms that ensure the continuation of social life - thus, show kindnesses, show gratitude, return favors, respect property, honor agreements, etc.  But the problem is, there's no guarantee that everyone will always observe those social norms.  It's one thing to say that the social norms are rational; it's another thing to say they're obligatory.  

Pufendorf addresses this problem directly, in the context of a discussion of Hobbes' De Cive on natural law, largely as a critique of Hobbes' working assumption of the anti-social, self-regarding quality of humans.  Pufendorf's position is distinct from both Grotius and Hobbes, but it's worth seeing how he gets around the problem of bridging the gap from rationality to obligation.

He generally shares Grotius' observation that humans are sociable, other-regarding, and motivated by a general sense of goodwill for others.  But I feel Pufendorf is more sensitive to the conflict between our self-interest and our sociableness.  

Pufendorf, De Jure Naturae et Gentium (1698), p. 140 (II, 3, §15).

'Man is an animal most eagerly devoted to preserving itself' above all else.  And yet, despite this self-devotion, Pufendorf acknowledges the limits of such a selfish life.  All the worthwhile advantages of living can't be realized without some measure of cooperation and mutual support.  So it becomes a kind of consequentialist argument:

Pufendorf, De Jure Naturae et Gentium (1698), p. 140

'It is necessary for humans to be sociable,' in order to enjoy all the benefits of social life.  Nor is it entirely a choice.  Like Grotius, Pufendorf acknowledges the natural quality of sociableness - we can't help but seek the goodwill of others, just as we show ours.

Pufendorf, p. 142 (II, 3, §16)

'For, we thus call human a 'sociable animal,' because humans supply mutual aid to each other, more so than any other animal.' 

Sociability, thus, may be rational and natural.  But why is it obligatory?  Pufendorf's response:

Pufendorf, p. 147 (II, 3, §20)

The obligatory force derives ultimately from God.  Humans are required by divine injunction to be sociable.  But he pivots, allowing both divine revelation and natural reason as pathways to obligation.  

All this suggests to me that there are two different stories to tell about natural law - one is a story of the evolution of norms, how rules take shape as a result of man's natural sociability.  The other is a story about legal obligation which can be accessed either by reason or by revelation.  I'm not sure what to do with the background theology of natural law, just yet.  Some of Pufendorf's following comments in this section suggest to me that he'd be satisfied with a Grotian 'etiamsi daremus'-style position: even if divinity were to be bracketed out of the picture, it might still be possible to show how natural law can be obligatory.