Pufendorf's Trolley Problem

After several weeks of performing a mandatory civic duty, I am now able to return to some work and transition finally into the lighter pace of summer.

One fascinating feature of this early modern legal literature on natural law is its engagement with topics that continue to remain live issues in contemporary moral and political philosophy.  Pufendorf supplies one example of this in a chapter where he discusses the so-called 'right of necessity' - whether extreme dangers to one's life releases one from ordinary moral and legal obligations and invokes, instead, a different style of moral reasoning based strictly on necessity.   

Pufendorf, De Jure Naturae et Gentium II, 6, §4.  Photos: Daniel Lee, 2023.

Pufendorf's analysis on what is permissible in times of extreme necessity and danger is notable particularly because it anticipates some of the vexing problems presented by so-called Trolley and Lifeboat-type Problems - namely, whether one life may be sacrificed for saving many other lives (or even just one other life) in such extreme conditions.

Pufendorf's own analysis suggests a cautious willingness to allow sacrificing of lives.  In a shipwreck, the one who is clinging onto a floating plank in the open sea to stay alive may push off another who is struggling to grab onto the same plank that will not hold more than one.  When two are being pursued by an enemy over a bridge, the one who crosses first may destroy or raise the bridge to avoid being killed (and saving those on the other side), even if that means sacrificing the other person who was originally being pursued.  Pufendorf turns out to be a consistent utilitarian in these cases of extreme necessity.   

What these kinds of texts reinforce for me is the point that my friends who work exclusively in political philosophy might benefit from such earlier sources, if only by providing additional source material to test their own normative theories.  Particularly in Roman law, there are some interesting cases that will appear (at least to a modern post-classical Western liberal mind) counter-intuitive (one example I've tried with my Roman law students this past term is the assignment of responsibility in the quasi-contractual case of negotiorum gestio.)  I doubt I'll be able to persuade current active political philosophers.  So I've already started on the next generation with my own students.